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Recently, it was found by Schneider et al. [Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 108, 3838 (2011)], using
simulations, that scale-free networks with “onion structure” are very robust against targeted high
degree attacks. The onion structure is a network where nodes with almost the same degree are
connected. Motivated by this work, we propose and analyze, based on analytical considerations,
an onion-like candidate for a nearly optimal structure against simultaneous random and targeted
high degree node attacks. The nearly optimal structure can be viewed as a set of hierarchically
interconnected random regular graphs, the degrees and populations of whose nodes are specified
by the degree distribution. This network structure exhibits an extremely assortative degree-degree
correlation and has a close relationship to the “onion structure.” After deriving a set of exact
expressions that enable us to calculate the critical percolation threshold and the giant component
of a correlated network for an arbitrary type of node removal, we apply the theory to the cases of
random scale-free networks that are highly vulnerable against targeted high degree node removal.
Our results show that this vulnerability can be significantly reduced by implementing this onion-like
type of degree-degree correlation without much undermining the almost complete robustness against
random node removal. We also investigate in detail the robustness enhancement due to assortative
degree-degree correlation by introducing a joint degree-degree probability matrix that interpolates
between an uncorrelated network structure and the onion-like structure proposed here by tuning a
single control parameter. The optimal values of the control parameter that maximize the robustness
against simultaneous random and targeted attacks are also determined. Our analytical calculations
are supported by numerical simulations.
PACS numbers: 89.20.Hh, 89.75.Fb, 89.75.Hc
Keywords: correlated networks; percolation theory; structural robustness; degree-based targeted attack
I. INTRODUCTION
Many complex systems in real world can be modeled
by complex networks [1–11]. Generally speaking, the
cooperative performance of complex systems fundamen-
tally relies on the global connectivity of their compo-
nents. These complicated systems are, however, usually
placed in an ever-changing external environment where
the components or the connections could be constantly
added, eliminated, or changed. Such changes may poten-
tially affect the global connectivity of the network under
consideration to the extent in which the global connectiv-
ity could be completely lost and the system represented
by the network will lose its functionality. The analysis
of the response of the global connectivity caused by the
alteration of the network, or targeted attacks, has been
therefore one of the main issues of the complex network
analysis.
Most of the existing theoretical studies on the robust-
ness of complex networks depend only on the degree dis-
tribution [5–31]. However, as noted by Newman, net-
works in real world exhibit rather strong tendency, or
correlation, in the connection between nodes of differ-
ent degrees [32]. He introduced the terms, assortative
∗ E-mail:tanizawa@ee.kochi-ct.ac.jp
and disassortative correlations, to describe the tendency
of nodes in a network to make connections between the
same degree and between different degrees, respectively,
and calculated how the giant component collapse for spe-
cific kinds of correlated networks against random node
removal. Newman applied the generating function for-
malism and showed the enhancement of the resiliency of
networks with assortative degree-degree correlation.
In addition to Newman’s pioneering work, there are
few theoretical works on robustness analysis including
degree-degree correlations [33–36]. Among these, Golt-
sev et al. focused on the evaluation of critical exponents
of correlated complex networks in the vicinity of node
percolation transition for the case of random node re-
moval [34]. Here we extend their formalism and proceed
to the robustness analysis of a correlated complex net-
work against arbitrary types of node removal.
Recently, Schneider et al. developed an interesting
numerical approach for enhancing network robustness
against high degree node removal [37, 38]. They start
from an uncorrelated random network with a given de-
gree distribution. Next, they randomly choose two pairs
of links and exchange the destinations of the two links
between them keeping the overall degree distribution un-
changed. If this exchange improves the robustness of the
network against targeted node removal, the exchange is
accepted. By repeating this procedure, the robustness of
the network is enhanced step by step. They applied this
2method to several types of networks with broad degree
distributions and found that the final robust networks
have a common “onion-like” topology consisting of a core
of highly connected nodes hierarchically surrounded by
rings of nodes with decreasing degree [37, 38]. In each
ring most of the nodes are of the same degree. A numer-
ical method that improves the convergence to the onion
structure is reported by Wu and Holme recently [39].
Motivated by the onion-like topology, we study here
analytically the robustness of a family of such systems.
In our approach we obtain analytical expressions for the
critical threshold and for the giant components, where
the degree-degree correlation is fully incorporated. Due
to the analytical approach, a statistical treatment over
large number of realizations as done in computer sim-
ulations is not needed to obtain definite results. Nev-
ertheless both analytical and simulation approaches are
necessary and complementary, in particular, for testing
the analytical approach. Interestingly, the optimal struc-
ture we find here against simultaneous random and tar-
geted high degree node removals is very similar to the
“onion-like” structure found by Schneider et al. [37]. The
optimal structure obtained consists of hierarchically and
weakly interconnected random regular graphs.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we
derive a set of analytical equations for the critical node
threshold and the giant component fraction for an arbi-
trary type of node removal where the degree-degree cor-
relation is fully incorporated. We begin our analysis in
Section III by presenting a simple theoretical argument
to derive the optimal network structure against targeted
high degree node removal. In Section IV, we describe the
properties of a set of separated random regular graphs as
the first step to understand the structure of the opti-
mal network described in the previous section. Support
of our analytical results by numerical simulations is also
presented. In Section V we analyze the properties of in-
terconnected random regular graphs of different degrees k
by introducing a joint degree probability matrix that can
describe the transition between a set of separated ran-
dom regular graphs and a completely uncorrelated single
random network by tuning a single control parameter un-
der the condition of having a fixed degree distribution.
The optimal values of the control parameter that max-
imize the robustness against simultaneous random and
targeted high degree node attacks is determined. In Sec-
tion VI we summarize the results.
II. THEORY
We start from the joint degree-degree probability ma-
trix, P (k, k′), which is the probability that a randomly
chosen link emanates from a k-degree node and ends
at a k′-degree node. In this article, we consider only
the cases of undirected networks, where the symmetry
P (k, k′) = P (k′, k) holds. The sum of P (k, k′) over k′ is
the probability that a randomly chosen link starts from
a k-degree node. It is related to the probability density
of the degree distribution, P (k), through the relation,∑
k′ P (k, k
′) = kP (k)/〈k〉, where 〈k〉 is the average de-
gree. By definition,
∑
k P (k) = 1. Note that the sum∑
k′ P (k, k
′) has to be fixed if we fix the degree dis-
tribution, P (k). The conditional probability, P (k′|k),
that a randomly chosen link emanating from a k-degree
node leads to a k′-degree node is defined by P (k′|k) ≡
P (k, k′)/
∑
k′ P (k, k
′) = P (k, k′)/ (kP (k)/〈k〉).
When the nodes of a network are removed according to
the degree of nodes, the remaining fraction of k-degree
nodes is reduced by a factor bk (0 ≤ bk ≤ 1) from the
original fraction, P (k). The total remaining fraction of
nodes, p, is calculated as p =
∑
k bkP (k).
The giant component in a complex network is a cluster
of connected nodes, where its normalized size in the net-
work, S, remains finite as the total number of nodes, N ,
becomes infinite. Non-zero values of S indicate a macro-
scopic connectivity of the network under consideration.
To calculate the critical value of the remaining fraction
of nodes, pc, above which the giant component, S, begins
to take a non-zero value, we extend the generating func-
tion method [16, 34] by incorporating the degree-degree
correlation under an arbitrary way of node removal. Let
xk be the probability that a randomly chosen link from
a k-degree node does not lead to the giant component.
Under the condition that the network only consists of
trees, which is justified in the limit of N →∞, the prob-
abilities, xk, (k = m,m+ 1, . . . ,K), for non-zero values
of bk, and the node fraction of the giant component, S,
are determined by the following set of equations:
xk = 1−
∑
k′
bk′P (k
′|k) +
∑
k′
bk′P (k
′|k) (xk′ )
k′−1
(1)
S = p−
∑
k
bkP (k) (xk)
k
=
∑
k
bkP (k)
(
1− (xk)
k
)
.
(2)
Obviously, xk = 1 for removing all k-degree nodes (bk =
0). Note that these equations contain the remaining frac-
tion of k-degree nodes, bk. Equations (1) and (2) are a
necessary extension of existing works in order to investi-
gate all types of node removal. The degree-degree corre-
lation is included in the conditional probability, P (k′|k).
Below the critical remaining fraction of nodes, all xk’s
are equal to one and it follows from Eq. (2) that S =
0 (no giant component). At criticality where the giant
component emerges, at least one of xk’s takes a value
slightly smaller than one. In the vicinity of the critical
point, we assume xk = 1−yk and expand Eq. (1) in terms
of infinitesimally positive quantities yk. The equation
obtained by this expansion becomes
yk =
∑
k′
Bkk′yk′ +O(y
2
k), (3)
where the “branching matrix,” Bkk′ , is defined by Bkk′ ≡
bk′P (k
′|k)(k′− 1). The eigenvalues of the branching ma-
trix are all non-negative and can be ordered according to
3their values. The critical point can be obtained by the
point at which the largest eigenvalue of Bkk′ becomes
unity [34].
As we will show in Section IV, we can also calculate
the critical exponent β defined by S ∼ |p− pc|
β
in the
vicinity of the critical point.
III. THE OPTIMAL STRUCTURE
Let us begin by reviewing the robustness of random
regular graphs, which are networks that consists of only
nodes with the same degree, k. Such networks serve as
components in the structure studied in this paper.
Since all nodes in a random regular graph have the
same degree, k, there is no difference between random
and targeted attacks. It is well known from percolation
theory that a random regular graph with degree k ≥ 2
contains a single giant component when the remaining
node fraction after random removal of nodes exceeds the
critical threshold pc = 1/(k−1). It should be pointed out
that the critical node threshold for the random regular
graph for k = 2 is one. This means that the giant com-
ponent for a random regular graph with k = 2 is always
critical and collapses as soon as a single node is removed.
Because of this criticality, the giant component fraction,
S, of a k = 2 random regular graph is not unity but close
to 0.8 [40].
The robustness of a given network depends on the
method of node removal. For example, scale-free net-
works are almost completely robust against random node
removal while they are extremely vulnerable against tar-
geted removal of high degree nodes [13, 14, 16, 17]. The
results for the robustness is, however, derived for ran-
dom networks and thus are based only on the degree dis-
tribution. It is interesting, therefore, to clarify to what
extent we are able to improve the robustness of a com-
plex network against targeted attack by introducing the
degree-degree correlation while keeping the network de-
gree distribution unchanged.
With this in mind, we focus on the improvement of
the robustness of complex networks against targeted high
degree node attack. We limit our analysis to networks
where the number of k-degree nodes decreases with in-
creasing k. In targeted high degree attack, all nodes that
have higher degrees than a certain value are eliminated.
Removing a node also eliminates all the edges attached
to it. Since the edges are connected with the remaining
lower degree nodes, the elimination of those edges under-
mines the global connectivity of the remaining lower de-
gree node component. In order to minimize such under-
mining effects as much as possible, the number of edges
that connect removed higher degree nodes and the re-
maining lower degree nodes should be minimized as much
as possible. Hence the following requirement should be
fulfilled.
Requirement: The k-degree nodes should not be con-
nected to nodes with degree, k′, lower than k (k′ < k).
This Requirement yields that most of the edges should
connect nodes of the same degree. Thus the optimal
structure built up from a set of random regular (RR)
graphs naturally emerges. To form an entirely connected
single network, these RR graphs must be connected with
one another. The most robust network against targeted
attack with a given degree distribution can, therefore, be
constructed by the following procedure.
1. Prepare a suitable number of nodes for each degree
according to the given degree distribution. We as-
sume that the number of nodes for each degree is so
large that all edges can find nodes to be attached
in both end points.
2. Let the smallest degree be m and begin to con-
struct the network from an m-degree component,
which is the last remaining component for targeted
high degree node removal. If the Requirement is
completely fulfilled, no edges of the m-degree com-
ponent are eliminated by targeted removal of nodes
with degree larger than but not equal to m. The
last remaining m-degree component forms, there-
fore, an RR graph of degree m.
3. Next, attach the nodes with degree m+1. Accord-
ing to the Requirement, the attached (m+1)-degree
nodes cannot be connected to the (smaller) m-
degree component. Thus all (m + 1)-degree nodes
should be connected with one-another and forms
an RR graph of degree (m+ 1).
Up to this point, the network consists of two sepa-
rated RR graphs with degree m and m+ 1. How-
ever, to make a single connected network we have
to connect these two components. To fulfill the Re-
quirement as much as possible under the condition
of the fixed degree distribution, we break two edges,
the one of which is in the RR graph of degree m
and the other of which is in the RR graph of degree
m + 1, and rewire these two edges. Note that this
rewiring does not change the degree distribution.
4. Attaching the nodes with next larger degree, m+2
can be performed in the same way. First, following
the Requirement, these nodes should be connected
with one-another. Hence, an RR graph with degree
m + 2 emerges. Next, to make a single connected
network under the conditions of the Requirement
and the fixed degree distribution, two edges in the
RR graph of degree m + 1 and the RR graph of
degree m+ 2 are broken and rewired.
By repeating this argument up to the nodes with
the largest degree, K, we reach the structure in
which RR graphs with degrees hierarchically up
from m to K are minimally interconnected. This
structure has a close resemblance with the robust
“onion-like” structure found using numerical simu-
lations by Schneider et al. [37, 38].
4In the following Sections, we investigate the properties
of this structure, which we also refer to as the “onion-
like” structure.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SEPARATED RANDOM
REGULAR GRAPHS
Let us begin with the case of a correlated network spec-
ified by a delta function-like joint degree probability ma-
trix,
P (k, k′) =
kP (k)
〈k〉
δkk′ . (4)
This joint degree probability matrix leads to the con-
ditional probability that is a complete delta function:
P (k′|k) = δkk′ . In this network, only the nodes with
the same degree are connected. The whole network is
therefore a set of random regular (RR) graphs of all de-
grees of nodes from m to K where each degree fraction is
specified by the degree distribution P (k). In Fig. 1, we
show an example of a set of RR graphs specified by Eq.
(4).
Since the onion structure proposed in the previous Sec-
tion consists of minimally connected RR graphs, we ex-
pect that the properties of this structure should be almost
identical to a set of separated RR graphs described by Eq.
(4). This is one of the reasons we begin our analysis with
a set of separated RR graphs.
Strictly speaking, there is no global giant component
in this network structure, since all RR graphs are sepa-
rated. We assume that the sum of the giant components
of each RR graph to be the “virtual” giant component in
this case. This definition of the “virtual” giant compo-
nent naturally reflects the “real” giant component when
we add a minimal number of connections, or “bridges,”
between these RR graphs.
The branching matrix, Bkk′ , for this set of RR graphs
is diagonal with the diagonal elements, Bkk = bk(k − 1),
which are identical to the eigenvalues of the branching
matrix (See Eq. (3)). Thus each RR graph with degree
k contained in this network becomes critical when the
remaining fraction of this mode, bk takes the critical value
b∗k =
1
k − 1
(k ≥ 2). (5)
When nodes are removed starting from the highest to
lower degrees, the bk’s of the removed degrees become
zero. The last remaining fraction of nodes is that of the
minimum degree, m, and the disappearance of the giant
component for this minimum degree indicates the col-
lapse of the finally remaining “virtual” giant component.
This occurs at
bm = b
∗
m =
1
m− 1
, bk = 0 (k > m). (6)
Thus the node removal threshold for targeted attack on
high degree nodes of this extremely assortative network
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FIG. 1. (Color online) An example of a set of separated ran-
dom regular graphs from k = 2 to k = 5. The total node
number N = 524 and the node number for each random regu-
lar graph is determined by the power-law degree distribution,
P (k) ∝ k−λ with λ = 2.6. Notice that the graph for k = 2 is
composed of separated rings, which can be fragmented by re-
moving of a tiny amount (zero fraction) of nodes. This means
that the giant component of the random regular graph for
k = 2 is always at the edge of criticality, as indeed predicted
by Eq. (5).
becomes
pc = b
∗
mP (m) =
P (m)
m− 1
. (7)
At the emergence of the giant component, when p & pc,
the node fraction of the giant component, S, is character-
ized by the critical exponent, β, as S ∼ |p− pc|
β
. Using
the exact equations, Eqs. (1) and (2), we can also evalu-
ate the value of β as follows.
We note again that the case, m = 2, is a little tricky.
In the first place, as we can see from Eq. (7), the giant
component of the regular graph of the smallest degree
does not emerge until all the nodes with degree two are
filled (b2 = 1). In other words, the giant component
suddenly disappear as soon as any single node of the
smallest degree two is removed. Thus the percolation
transition in this case is discontinuous and a finite value
of S suddenly appear at pc = P (2). Second, the giant
component for k = 2 is always critical and only about
80% of the nodes of this smallest degree participate in
the giant component [40]. The rest of the nodes of k = 2
form tiny rings, which do not contribute to the giant
component.
For m ≥ 3, the transition is continuous at pc =
P (m)/(m − 1). In this case, we can also evaluate the
5critical exponent β as follows. For p & pc, non-trivial
solutions for Eq. (1), which is
xk = 1− bk
(
1− (xk)
k−1
)
(8)
in this case, emerge. Let us assume xm = 1−ε, where ε &
0, in the equation for the lowest degree m, and expand
Eq. (8) up to the second order of ε. This gives
ε =
2
m− 2
{
1−
1
bm (m− 1)
}
+O
(
ε2
)
. (9)
Since only the sub-graph of the lowest degree m ex-
ists at the criticality, the remaining node fraction is
p = bmP (m); therefore p− pc = (bm − b
∗
m)P (m). Notice
that b∗m = 1/ (m− 1). Thus we can rewrite Eq. (9) as
ε =
2
b∗mP (m) (m− 2)
|p− pc|+O
(
|p− pc|
2
)
. (10)
Together with Eq. (2), which is
S = bmP (m) (1− (xm)
m) (11)
in this extremely assortative case, we obtain
S =
2m
m− 2
|p− pc|+O
(
|p− pc|
2
)
. (12)
This means β = 1. It is interesting that in the limit
m→∞,
S ≈ 2 |p− pc| (m→∞) (13)
in the vicinity of the transition.
To verify the above theoretical arguments, we com-
pare the size of “virtual” giant component obtained from
theory with the “real” giant component of the onion
structure proposed in the previous Section obtained by
numerical simulation. We focus on the cases of net-
works with a power-law degree distribution (scale-free
networks), where the degree distribution is represented
by P (k) ∝ k−λ.
The results are shown in Fig. 2 for scale-free networks
with λ = 2.6. For the total number of nodes, N , in these
simulations, we take N ≈ 900 for K = 5 and N ≈ 12000
for K = 10 with m = 2 and N ≈ 900 for K = 5 and
N ≈ 20000 for K = 20 with m = 3. The agreement
is excellent and thus supporting the analytical results
based on Eqs. (1) and (2). Note, as seen in Fig.2, that
the value of the maximum degree K does not play an
important role for the improvement of the robustness
against targeted attack. This can be understood since
the highest degree nodes represent a low fraction of the
network nodes and are selectively removed in the targeted
attack.[41]
We also show in these figures the values of the giant
component fraction of the uncorrelated (random) net-
work with the same degree distribution as a function
of the remaining nodes. It is clear that the strong as-
sortativity, obtained using the construction principle de-
scribed in Sec. III, considerably improves the robustness
of the scale-free network against targeted high degree
node removal.
V. A MODEL FOR INTERCONNECTED
RANDOM REGULAR GRAPHS
A. The joint degree matrix
To investigate the effect of connections between ran-
dom regular (RR) graphs and to study the robustness
of onion-like structures analytically, we propose the fol-
lowing model where the joint degree-degree probability
matrix is defined by
P (k, k′) ∝
kP (k)
〈k〉
k′P (k′)
〈k〉
exp
[
−
(k − k′)
2
σ2
]
, (14)
which is normalized by the conditions
∑
k′ P (k, k
′) =
kP (k)/〈k〉 and
∑
kk′ P (k, k
′) = 1. This matrix, Eq. (14),
contains a control parameter, σ. In the limit, σ → 0,
the joint degree-degree matrix is that of separated RR
graphs, Eq. (4), and in the limit, σ → ∞, it approaches
to that of a completely random single uncorrelated net-
work. Note that for any value of σ, the degree dis-
tribution, P (k), is fixed and given by the sum rule,∑
k′ P (k, k
′) = kP (k)/〈k〉.
As mentioned earlier, an RR graph for k = 2 gener-
ally consists of many separated rings. Therefore, it is
expected that until the control parameter for connection
between RR graphs, σ, obtains a suitably large value,
the largest connected component, which belongs to the
k = 2 component, is not firmly connected to the larger
degree (k > m) components. In Fig. 3, we show the
fraction of the largest connected component of a scale-
free network specified by Eq. (14) with the exponent
λ = 2.6, minimum degree m = 2, and maximum degrees
K = 10 and 100 as a function of σ, which is obtained by
numerical calculations using the analytical expressions,
Eqs. (1) and (2). From this Figure, we can see that for
m = 2 we need σ & 0.35 for the largest connected com-
ponent to span the entire network. For m ≥ 3, we find
(not shown) that the largest connected component always
spans the entire network for any non-negative value of σ.
B. The critical percolation threshold
The critical percolation threshold, pc, is the minimum
value of the remaining node fraction required for a unique
giant component to be of the order of the entire network
under a given way of node removal. The threshold pc
is a useful measure of the structural robustness of the
network. A smaller value of pc means that the network
is more robust, since we need to remove more nodes in
order to destroy the giant component.
We calculate pc using the theoretical framework de-
scribed in Section II. For a given way of node removal,
the critical point for the vanishing giant component is
specified by the point at which the largest eigenvalue of
the branching matrix Bkk′ = bk′P (k
′|k)(k′ − 1) becomes
unity. (See Eq. (3).)
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Plots of the values of the “virtual” giant component, S, as a function of the remaining fraction of nodes,
p, obtained theoretically for extremely assortative scale-free networks specified by Eq. (4) for various values of the maximum
degree K. The degree distribution is fixed to the power-law k−λ with an exponent λ = 2.6: (a) The giant component S for
m = 2 and (b) S for m = 3. The values of S for networks with the onion structure obtained by both theory and numerical
simulations as well as the giant component fraction of the corresponding uncorrelated random scale-free network for K = 5 are
shown. In (a), the values of S for completely separated RR graphs (with no “bridges”) obtained by simulation are also added
for K = 10 for comparison. Notice that the difference between the values for the onion structure and those of the separated
RR graphs are small for m = 2 and K = 10. For m = 3, this difference is indistinguishable.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) The fraction of the largest connected
component of scale-free networks with the exponent λ = 2.6,
minimum degree m = 2, and maximum degrees K = 10, 100
as a function of the parameter, σ, that controls the assor-
tativity of the degree-degree correlation. Above σ ≈ 0.35,
the separated k = 2 components become connected to the
larger degree components and the largest connected compo-
nent spans the entire network.
In Fig. 4, we plot the threshold, pc, as a function of
σ for several scale-free networks. For all calculations,
the values of pc deviate from those of the uncorrelated
networks (seen at larger σ) and become smaller (more
robust) as σ decreases and the strong assortative degree-
degree correlation sets in. Finally the values of pc con-
verge to P (2)+P (3)/2 for the networks with m = 2 and
to P (3)/2 with m = 3 in the range σ . 1, where m is the
minimum degree.
The limiting values of pc for small values of σ can be
understood as follows. In the limit σ → 0, the network
tends to a set of separated random regular (RR) graphs
for each degree. In this case there is no single giant
component but a set of giant components of each RR
graph. For the case when the minimum degree m = 2,
the RR graph of the smallest degree (k = 2) is composed
of “rings” and therefore always critical, which means the
global connectivity of this component of k = 2 collapse
as soon as even a single node from this component is re-
moved. We can see this also from the fact that the critical
node threshold for the random regular graph of k = 2 is
pc = 1/(k − 1) = 1. The giant component vanishes as
soon as a node in the last remaining component (k = 2)
containing the fraction P (2) of nodes is removed. Thus,
pc = P (2) for σ = 0. Above some positive finite value of
σ, however, the separated RR graphs become intercon-
nected (hierarchically). In this case, σ > 0, the smallest
degree component (k = 2) of the whole network is con-
nected to the k = 3 component. This connection breaks
up the giant component in the RR graph for k = 2, since
the k = 2 component is always critical. The final giant
component collapse thus comes when the global connec-
tivity of the k = 3 component is lost. The threshold
for the k = 3 component is 1/(k − 1) = 1/2. Thus, the
critical node threshold at the collapse is expected to be
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Plots of the critical node threshold against targeted high degree node attack as a function of the
parameter σ that controls the assortativity of the degree-degree correlation (See Eq. (14).) for several scale-free networks. (a)
Scale-free networks with the exponent λ = 2.6 and minimum degree m = 2. The (blue) solid curve is for a network with
maximum degree K = 10 and the (red) dotted curve is for K = 100. (b) Scale-free networks with m = 2 and K = 100. The
(blue) solid curve is for λ = 2.2 and the (red) dotted curve is for λ = 2.6. (c) Scale-free networks with λ = 2.6 and m = 3.
The (blue) solid curve is for K = 10 and the (red) dotted curve is for the network with K = 100. (d) Scale-free networks with
m = 3 and K = 100. The (blue) solid curve is for λ = 2.2 and the (red) dotted curve is for λ = 2.6. For small values of σ, where
the network structure approaches to be composed of weakly interconnected RR graphs, all critical node thresholds approach
to P (2) + P (3)/2 for m = 2 and to P (3) for m = 3. For all these cases, the giant component spans the entire network at the
beginning of the node removal. Note that a smaller value of pc generally means a more robust network structure.
pc = P (2) + P (3)/2 for σ > 0. (See Fig. 4 (a) and (b).)
Since for σ = 0, pc = P (2), there is a discontinuity of pc
for m = 2 at σ = 0. Note that in Fig. 4 (a) and (b) for
m = 2, we only show the giant components for σ & 0.35
where the largest connected component spans the entire
network.
For m ≥ 3, the last remaining giant component is that
of the smallest degree network which is not critical for
any non-zero value of σ. The critical node threshold at
the collapse of the giant component is, therefore, pc =
P (m)/(m−1) (see Eq. (7), Figs. 4 (c) and (d)). We have
also checked the continuity of the threshold as a function
of σ by numerically calculating pc for σ & 0.01.
It is clear that when we only consider the robustness
against targeted high degree node attack the limit σ →
0 always gives the most robust structure, which is the
minimally interconnected RR graphs.
C. Giant component collapse
In Fig. 5, we show the way of the giant component col-
lapses for various values of σ for scale-free networks with
an exponent, λ = 2.6. Figures 5 (a) and (b) correspond
to a network with m = 2 and Figs. 5 (c) and (d) corre-
spond to a network with m = 3. Note that for m = 2
the giant component corresponds to a network composed
of nodes mainly with the minimum degree, m = 2. It
is therefore at the edge of criticality for extremely assor-
tative correlation (σ → 0). This is the reason for the
sudden collapse of the giant component in the vicinity of
infinitesimal removal of node by random attack, which is
represented by the solid curve for σ = 0.4 in Fig. 5 (b).
From Figs. 5 (a) and (c) which represent the cases
of targeted attack, we can see that the strong assorta-
tive degree-degree correlation that leads to the structure
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Plots of the giant component fraction, S, as a function of remaining nodes, p, for several values of σ.
The plots for the scale-free networks for λ = 2.6, m = 2, and K = 10 are (a) for targeted attack and (b) for random attack.
The plots for the scale-free networks for λ = 2.6, m = 3, and K = 10 are (c) for targeted attack and (d) for random attack. For
comparison, we also plot in (a) and (c) the curves of the giant component for uncorrelated networks and the curves for random
regular (RR) networks where all degrees are the same as the average degree, 〈k〉, of the corresponding scale-free networks. The
lines S = p in (a) and (c) are guides for eyes and represent an optimal network.
of weakly interconnected random regular graphs yields
much smaller values of pc, which is P (2) + P (3)/2 for
m = 2 and P (3)/2 for m = 3, compared to the corre-
sponding uncorrelated networks. We also see from Figs.
5 (a) and (c) that, for p > pc, S ≈ p when σ . 1 until the
sharp decrease in S near pc sets in. This means that in
this case the removal of high degree nodes does not affect
the connectivity of the remaining giant component and
that the networks for σ . 1 have almost the maximum
robustness against targeted attack.
From Figs. 5 (b) and (d), we can see that the giant com-
ponent decreases faster in the early stages of the random
node removal, while the values of the critical node thresh-
old are slightly lower from those of random networks due
to the assortative degree-degree correlation.
The decrease of σ has, therefore, opposite effects in
terms of the giant component collapse with respect to
targeted and random attacks. For targeted attack, the
collapse of the giant component is maximally suppressed
(S ≈ p) for small values of σ . 1, while for random at-
tack the collapse sets in earlier compared to in the cases
of uncorrelated (random) networks. This fact means that
there must be an optimal value of σ that considers both
targeted and random attacks. The structure of the net-
work at this σ suppresses the giant component collapse as
much as possible for targeted attack as well as maintain-
ing a sufficient fraction of giant component for random
attack.
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Schematic profiles of the giant compo-
nent as a function of the remaining node fraction for the two
typical cases. The case (a) has a larger value of the critical
node threshold, pc, than (b), but the giant component col-
lapse for (a) occurs much slower than for the case (b). From
the viewpoint of the global connectivity, the value of the area
below S(p) represented by R is a better measure of the ro-
bustness than the critical threshold, pc.
D. Robustness optimization
To identify the optimal structure for both targeted and
random attacks we propose the following approach. In
Fig. 6, we show schematic profiles of the giant compo-
nent fraction as a function of p for two possible scenarios
motivated by the curves appearing in Figs. 5(a) and (b).
The case represented by Fig. 6(a) has a larger value of
the critical node threshold, pc, than that of Fig. 6(b). On
the other hand a large fraction of the giant component
collapse after removal of a small fraction of nodes for the
case (b) in contrast to (a). From the viewpoint of the
macroscopic connectivity, the value of the area under the
curve S(p) represented by R is a better measure of the
robustness, as proposed by Schneider et al.[37, 38], com-
pared to the critical node threshold, pc, and we apply in
the following. Note that this measure R has the absolute
upper bound of 0.5.
Since we are considering the total robustness against
both targeted and random attacks, we define the total
robustness measure Rtot as the sum of the robustness
measure for targeted attack and that for random attack.
Defining the total measure as the sum of the measures
against both attacks is also found in earlier literature
[24–26]. Note that the maximum value of Rtot equals
to unity for networks with complete robustness in which
pc = 0 and S = p for both targeted and random attacks.
Figure 7 shows Rtot as a function of σ for two scale-
free networks. The plot in Fig. 7(a) is for a scale-free
network with λ = 2.6, m = 2, andK = 10. The measure,
Rtot, reaches the maximum value of approximately 0.54
at σopt ≈ 1.33. Figure 7(b) is for a scale-free network
with λ = 2.6, m = 3, and K = 10. The measure, Rtot,
reaches the maximum value of approximately 0.8715 at
σopt ≈ 0.646. Noticing that the limit σ → 0 leads to
the separated random regular (RR) networks and that
σ is the measure of the maximum degree difference of
connected nodes (See Eq. (14)), the fact that σopt ≈ 1
for both cases of m = 2 and m = 3 indicates that the
optimal network structure is the one where most of the
k-degree nodes are connected with each other and only a
small fraction of remaining k-degree nodes are connected
with (k− 1) or (k+ 1)-degree nodes. We find here again
the onion-like structure. The reason that σopt for m = 2
is slightly larger than the one for m = 3 is due to the
criticality of the smallest degree component of k = 2.
In Fig. 8, we plot the giant components for targeted
and random attacks as a function of p for the optimally
correlated scale-free networks with λ = 2.6 and K = 10
for the cases m = 2 (σ = 1.33) and m = 3 (σ = 0.646).
In all plots, the theoretical values of the giant compo-
nent fraction are represented by full curves. The critical
node thresholds for targeted attack are P (2)+P (3)/2 for
m = 2 and P (3)/2 for m = 3, respectively. For compari-
son, we also plot the curves for the corresponding uncor-
related scale-free network with the same parameters and
for the RR network of the same degree as the average
degree of the corresponding scale-free networks. These
results show that the robustness of scale-free networks
against targeted attack can be significantly improved up
to nearly maximal by taking the structure of weakly in-
terconnected RR graphs (onion-like structures) without
much undermining their intrinsic robustness against ran-
dom failure.
For testing our theoretical considerations, we also sim-
ulate actual networks according to the joint degree ma-
trix, Eq. (14), with the optimal values of σ, which are
1.33 for m = 2 and 0.646 for m = 3. The circles in Fig. 8
are obtained by direct node removal from the simulated
optimal networks. For each realization, the number of
nodes for m = 2 is 6993 and for m = 3 is 2795. The
agreement between the simulation results and the theo-
retical calculations is excellent.
VI. SUMMARY
As a strong candidate for the optimal structure against
both types of attacks, random and targeted, with a given
degree distribution, the structure consisting of hierarchi-
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FIG. 7. The values of the total robustness measure Rtot as a function of σ for two scale-free networks. Plot (a) is for a scale-free
network with λ = 2.6, m = 2, and K = 10 and plot (b) is for a scale-free network with λ = 2.6, m = 3, and K = 10. The
numerically obtained optimal values of σ that maximize Rtot are σ = 1.33 for m = 2 and σ = 0.646 for m = 3.
cally interconnected random regular graphs is proposed
and thoroughly investigated based on exact analytical
expressions. This network structure has a close relation-
ship with the “onion-like structure” found by Schneider
et al. [37, 38] using numerical simulations and exhibits an
extremely assortative degree-degree correlation, in which
a node of certain degree has a strong tendency to be
linked with nodes of the same degree. We derive a set
of exact expressions that enable us to calculate the criti-
cal node threshold and the giant component fraction for
arbitrary types of node removal, in which the degree-
degree correlation is fully incorporated. To test the ro-
bustness of this structure, we apply the theory to the case
of scale-free networks that have a well-known vulnerabil-
ity against targeted attack. The results show that the
vulnerability of a scale-free network can be significantly
improved by taking the network structure proposed here
without much undermining its almost complete robust-
ness against random attack. We also investigate the de-
tail of the robustness enhancement of scale-free networks
due to assortative degree-degree correlation by introduc-
ing a joint degree-degree probability matrix that inter-
polates between an uncorrelated network structure and
the structure with strong assortativity by tuning a sin-
gle control parameter. The optimal values of the control
parameter that maximize the robustness against simulta-
neous random and targeted attacks are also determined
and those optimal values support the maximal robustness
of the “onion-like structure.” Our analytical calculations
are supported by numerical simulations.
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